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THE RETROACTIVE REACH OF LEARY
V. UNITED STATES
Throughout the past decade the United States Supreme Court has been
extraordinarily active in expanding the constitutionally protected rights
of citizens accused of crime.1 During this period the Court has dealt
with problems arising at every stage of the criminal process, from search
and seizure in Mapp v. Ohio, to an indigent's right to counsel on appeal
in Douglas v. California. But one problem that has remained a con-
stant in these diverse landmark rulings is the problem of retroactivity.
2
When the Supreme Court announces a new constitutional rule of
criminal procedure, it does not usually deal with the question of what
effect the new rule is to have on parties in cases other than the one at
bar.3 Thus, it generally devolves first upon the inferior courts to de-
termine the extent to which a new rule will operate retroactively. The
Supreme Court takes up the retroactivity issue only when it reveiws a
lower-court decision in which the issue has been presented in concrete
terms. In United States v. Scott,4 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit gave full retroactive effect to the new rule announced in Leary
v. United States.5 It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court
will uphold the Ninth Circuit's disposition.
The New Rule Announced in Leary
In December of 1965 Dr. Timothy Leary, along with his minor
daughter, was arrested after having been found in possession of mari-
1. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. At the outset it is helpful to define some terms that are frequently misused: a
new decision is fully retroactive when it applies to all cases, even to those in which the
judgment has become final; a decision is purely prospective when it applies only to
cases which have arisen after the date of decision of the new ruling--such rulings do
not even apply to the parties whose case served as the vehicle for the new rule; be-
tween these two extremes are rulings denominated partially retroactive, i.e., the new
ruling applies only to some stages of the judicial process and not others, and never to
final decisions.
This article shall deal with retroactivity in the criminal area, but the problem is
just as acute when dealing with civil litigation. See, e.g., Comment, Retroactive Appli-
cation of New Decisions-Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 21 HASTINGS LJ. 877 (1970).
3. It is the theory of some that this is because of the article III "case or con-
troversy" limitation of the Constitution. See Comment, Prospective Overruling and
Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 930-33 (1962).
4. 425 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1970).
5. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
huana powder and cigarettes. Several months later they were tried and
convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas, inter alia6 for violation of the Narcotic Drugs and Import
Act section 2(h).7 That section (hereinafter referred to as section
176a) makes it a crime to have facilitated the transportation, conceal-
ment or sale of marihuana knowing that such marihuana had been
brought into the United States contrary to law. The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction in 1967.8
On appeal to the Supreme Court,9 Leary contended that his con-
viction was a denial of due process in violation of the fifth amendment
inasmuch as a presumption authorized by that statute allowed the trier
of fact to infer the defendant's knowledge of the imported nature of the
marihuana from the mere fact of possession. 10 Leary argued that be-
cause knowledge of importation was a primary constitutive element of
the offense, and because there was no rational connection between pos-
session and knowledge of importation, therefore the presumption per-
mitted conviction without proof of the crime."
6. Leary was also convicted of violating 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a)(2) (1964), a
section of the Marihuana Tax Act that prohibits transportation or concealment of mari-
huana by one who has acquired it without having paid the transfer tax as required by
26 U.S.C. §§ 4741-43 (1964). This conviction was also reversed by the Supreme
Court on the grounds that it violated Leary's fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. The district court had earlier dismissed a smuggling count, also under
21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964), arising out of the fact that Leary was crossing the border
at the time of his arrest. Leary's minor daughter was indicted on the same three
counts but was convicted only of violating the Marihuana Tax Act; she was placed
on probation and withdrew her appeal. For a discussion of the entire case, see 83
HARv. L. REv. 103 (1969).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964), which provides in part: "[Wihoever, knowingly,
with intent to defraud the United States, imports or brings into the United States
marihuana contrary to law, or smuggles or clandestinely introduces into the United
States marihuana which should have been invoiced, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or
in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such marihuana af-
ter being imported or brought in, knowing the same to have been imported or brought
into the United States contrary to law, or whoever conspires to do any of the foregoing
acts, shall be imprisoned not less than five or more than twenty years-and, in addi-
tion, may be fined not more than $20,000 ...
"Whenever on trial for violation of this subsection, the defendant is shown to have
or to have had the marihuana in his possession, such possession shall be deemed suf-
ficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains his possession to
the satisfaction of the jury." (emphasis added).
8. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 395 U.S. 6
(1969). In the appellate court Leary contended that the Federal laws concerning
marihuana were violative of his right to the free exercise of his religion.
9. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
10. See note 7 supra.
11. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between presumptions in a
criminal trial and due process, see Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and
Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969).
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The Supreme Court agreed and reversed Leary's conviction. It
applied the formula previously set out in Tot v. United States12 for de-
termining the constitutionality of such a presumption; that is, there
must "be a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
presumed."' 8
After reviewing the congressional hearings and supportive materials
that lead to the passage of section 176a in 1956 and determining that
there was indeed a basis in fact for a presumption that most of the
marihuana found in this country has been imported, the Leary Court
found the necessary "rational connection" betweeii the fact of posses-
sion and knowledge of illegal importation lacking, and concluded:
[T]he materials at our disposal leave us at large to estimate even
roughly the proportion of marihuana possessors who have learned
in one way or another the origin of their marihuana. It must also
be recognized that a not inconsiderable proportion of domestically
consumed marihuana appears to have been grown in this country,
and that its possessors must be taken to have "known," if any-
thing, that their marihuana was not illegally imported. In short, it
would be no more than speculation were we to say that even as
much as a majority of possessors "knew" the source of their mari-
huana.14
As was to be expected, Leary had an immediate impact on pro-
secutions for violations of section 176a.15 The task of determining
the extent of its retroactive application fell to the lower federal courts.
Over the last several years, the Supreme Court has furnished the lower
courts with various sets of guidelines with varying degrees of exactness.
The Ninth Circuit's position on the retroactivity question is set forth in'
Scott; to understand this position fully, it is necessary to review only
the broad contours of these guidelines."6
12. 319 U.S. 463 (1943); cf. United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965);
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
13. 319 U.S. at 467, cited in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 33 (1969).
14. 395 U.S. at 52-53. The Court went on to "conclude that the 'knowledge'
aspect of the § 176a presumption cannot be upheld without making serious incursions
into the teaching of Tot, Gainey, and Romano:" Id. One year after Leary, in Turner
v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970), the Court upheld a presumption, identical to the
one found in section 176a, that the possessor of heroin knew that the narcotic had been
imported.
15. E.g., Jordan v. United States, 416 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Lopez, 414 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1969). See also United States v. Sorenson, 308 F. Supp.
1268 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), where the court applies the Leary standard to a similar pre-
sumption under an analogous statute.
16. Much has been written concerning the problem of retroactivity in the last
several years. Among the leading articles are, Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court,
The Great Writ, and The Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56 (1965);
Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin,
33 U. Cm. 1. R v. 719 (1966); Comment, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Ap-
plication in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE UJ. 907 (1962).
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Supreme Court Guidelines on Retroactivity
Prior to 1965, the subject of retroactivity had been given little
attention by the Supreme Court." Recognizing, however, that the
new constitutional rulings of the previous few terms were causing con-
fusion in the lower state and federal courts, the Supreme Court felt con-
strained to deal with the retroactivity problem at some length.
In Linkletter v. Walker,'" Mr Justice Clark reviewed in detail
the history of retroactivity 9 and the philosophical rationales of the
conflicting theories involved." He concluded that there had indeed
been certain definite criteria, albeit unstated, underlying the Court's
application of retroactivity in the past.21 Justice Clark then set forth
what he hoped would be a definitive rule by which the lower courts
might determine whether a particular new decision should be retro-
actively applied:
[W]e must. . . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by look-
ing to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and ef-
fect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its
operation.22
Justice Clark concluded with words that remain the touchstone in this
17. "It is true that heretofore, without discussion, we have applied new constitu-
tional rules to cases finalized before the promulgation of the rule." Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628 (1965); e.g., Smith v. Crouse, 378 U.S. 584 (1964), giving
retroactivity to Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), which dealt with an indi-
gent's right to counsel on appeal; Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964), giving
retroactivity to Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which dealt with an indi-
gent's right to counsel; Eskridge v. Washington State Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958), giving
retroactivity to Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), which dealt with an indigent's
right to have a trial transcript furnished for the purpose of an appeal.
18. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
19. "Thus, the accepted rule today is that in appropriate cases the Court may in
the interest of justice make the rule prospective." Id. at 628.
20. Justice Clark discussed the Blackstonian view that courts merely "discover"
principles as they have always existed and the Austinian view that courts "make law" by
filling in vague and indefinite terms. Id. at 622-24.
21. "Under our cases it appears (1) that a change in law will be given effect
while a case is on direct review, . . . and (2) that the effect of the subsequent ruling
of invalidity on prior final judgments when collaterally attacked is subject to no set
'principle of absolute retroactive invalidity' but depends upon a consideration of 'par-
ticular relations . . . and particular conduct . . . , of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality'; and 'of public policy
in the light of the danger both of the statute and of its previous application.'" 381
U.S. at 627, citing Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371,
374 (1940).
22. 381 U.S. at 629. The Court then applied these criteria to Linkletter, a
habeas corpus proceeding. The Court denied Linkletter, who was convicted in 1960, the
benefits of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), even though conceding that Link-
letter's search was unlawful by Mapp standards.
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area. In all the cases, he observed, where the Court had granted full
retroactivity to a new decisional rule, "the principle that we applied
went to the fairness of the trial-the very integrity of the fact-finding
process.12 3
Soon after Linkletter, it became obvious that these general guide-
lines required more precise formulation. Two years later, the Court
restated its rule in Stovall v. Denno:24
The criteria guiding resolution of the [retroactivity] question impli-
cate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the
extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a
retrospective application of the new standards.25
As questions concerning the retroactivity of various new Supreme
Court decisions continued to be handled differently in the federal and
state courts, the Court further refined its doctrine in 1969 in Desist v.
United States.26 Mr. Justice Stewart spoke the latest word on the
subject when he referred to the three criteria in Stovall, and said,
"Foremost among these factors is the purpose to be served by the new
constitutional rule."2 7  "It is to be noted also," he continued, "that
we have relied heavily on the factors of the extent of reliance and con-
sequent burden on the administration of justice only when the purpose
of the rule in question did not clearly favor either retroactivity or pros-
pectivity."2 8
In summary, by the time the Ninth Circuit rendered its decision
in Scott, the Supreme Court had enunciated the three criteria of Sto-
vail29 and had laid down in Desist a primary emphasis upon the first
criterion-the purpose to be served by the new rule. It is against this
background that the Ninth Circuit's Scott decision must be evaluated.
United States v. Scott-Leary Held "Fully Retroactive"
The facts in Scott were uncomplicated. Defendant Philip Scott,
23. 381 U.S. at 639.
24. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
25. Id. at 297. Again, in a habeas corpus proceeding, Stovall was denied the ef-
fects of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), decided the same day, and which
required counsel at any pre-trial confrontation. The Court in Stovall felt that the num-
ber of those convicted to whom retroactive application of Wade would apply and the re-
sultant heavy burden on law enforcement officials outweighed any benefits to be
gained by assigning full retroactivity to that decision. 388 U.S. at 299-300.
26. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
27. Id. at 249.
28. Id. at 251. Once again, Desist himself was denied relief, the Court holding
that the decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), was only to apply to
cases in which the illegal electronic surveillance had occurred after the date of the
Katz decision.
29. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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a resident of Los Angeles, was doing a used lumber business with a
concern in Mexico. Federal narcotices agent Gordon, suspecting that
the business was a front, arranged through a friend of Scott's (codefen-
dant Walker) to make a purchase of fifty kilos (approximately 110
pounds) of marihuana from Scott. Gordon went with Walker to Scott's
apartment to conclude the deal. While they were there, codefendant
Rico arrived with a large trunk. Scott carried it into the apartment,
opened it, counted out the bricks of marihuana and demanded his
money. The three were then arrested by Gordon. Scott was tried
and convicted"0 in the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California for violating section 176a. He took an appeal to
the Ninth Circuit contending "that the inclusion in the instructions to
the jury of the presumption contained in section 176a, held unconstitu-
tional in part in Leary v. United States . . .compels reversal of his
conviction. ... 31
Scott's appeal was decided in early March 1970. The Ninth
Circuit had first dealt with the question of the retroactivity of Leary
6 months earlier in Jordan v. United States.32  The Jordan appeal
was argued in May 1969, 6 days before the Supreme Court decided
Leary. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit, when it decided Jordan,
had not had the benefit of either briefs or oral argument on whether
and to what extent Leary should be given retroactive application.
The court, without discussing the problem at all, summarily applied
Leary to Jordan, a direct-appeal case (thereby giving Leary at least
partial retroactivity). At approximately the same time (July 1969),
the Ninth Circuit determined to tackle head-on the problem of Leary's
retroactivity. They withdrew Scott, the next section 176a case in
line, from the three-judge panel to which it had been assigned, set it
for rehearing en banc and at the same time requested supplementary
briefs from counsel on both sides. This move was doubtless prompted
by the considerable number of section 176a appeals then on file33 (and,
it can be assumed, by the anticipated number of habeas corpus peti-
30. United States v. Scott, 425 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1970). Codefendant Walker
was convicted along with Scott; a mistrial was declared as to Rico.
31. Id. at 57. Scott also contended that section 167a was unconstitutional be-
cause it was an indirect enforcement of the Marihuana Tax Act. The court rejected
this second contention, holding that although section 176a forbade traffic in marihuana
"contrary to law," that law was not necessarily the Marihuana Tax Act-any existing
law of the United States for which a penalty existed was sufficient, e.g., the customs
inspection statutes, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1461-62 (1964), and the provisions of section 176a
itself relating to smuggling. Id. at 60.
32. 416 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1969).
33. Within 3 weeks after the date of decision in Scott, the Ninth Circuit handed
down Plascencia-Plascencia v. United States, 423 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1970), and
United States v. Leyva-Barragan, 423 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1970). There followed in
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tions from prisoners whose convictions on section 176a had become
final). Instead of simply reversing Scott's conviction on the authority
of Jordan, the court felt constrained to determine the exact degree of
the Leary rule's retroactive operation.
At his trial, Scott failed to except to the jury instruction based
on the Leary presumption. The court of appeals nevertheless deter-
mined that Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
allowed them to hear an appeal from this instruction since the failure to
object was excusable-defendant's counsel could be expected to do lit-
tle but to go along with the great weight of authority on this subject at
the time of trial . 4
After reviewing the guidelines set forth in Linkletter, Stovall and
Desist,85 Judge Hufstedler, writing for the majority in Scott, said:
Accordingly, where the new constitutional rule is fashioned to cor-
rect a serious flaw in the fact-finding process and therefore goes
to the basic integrity and accuracy of the guilt-innocence determi-
nation, retroactive effect will be accorded. 36
In applying this circuit's interpretation of the Supreme Court's retro-
activity guidelines to the Leary rule, which overturned the section 176a
presumption, Judge Hufstedler reasoned as follows:
The invalidated portion of the presumption was an integral part of
the fact-finding process. The use of the presumption affected the
integrity of the determination of guilt, and its use was neither sec-
ondary in importance nor infrequent in occurance. The Govern-
ment's use of the presumption permitted it to bypass proof of sub-
stantive elements of the offense, thus creating a "serious risk that
the issue of guilt or innocence may not have been reliably deter-
mined."37
Finally, going much further than was strictly necessary for the pur-
pose of this direct appeal, the court held that in the Ninth Circuit the
Leary decision "partially invalidating the presumption is fully retroac-
tive.' 38  Although this must be classified as dictum, 9 it is nonetheless
quick succession United States v. Cepelis, 426 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Martinez, 425 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Buck, 425 F.2d 726
(9th Cir. 1970).
34. 425 F.2d at 57, citing Costello v. United States, 324 F.2d 260 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 930 (1964); Caudillo v. United States, 253 F.2d 513
(9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Romero v. United States, 357 U.S. 931 (1958).
35. See text accompanying notes 22, 25, & 27 supra.
36. 425 F.2d at 58. The court continued: "Retroactivity has been denied or lim-
ited only in instances where the rule does not go to the fairness of the trial, or where
the flaw in the fact-finding process is either of secondary importance or of infrequent
occurrence." Id.
37. Id. at 59, citing Roberts v. Russel, 392 U.S. 293, 295 (1968).
38. Id.
39. This is the weakness in Scott. Although the circuit will undoubtedly follow
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quite authoritative (eight judges of the court concurred therein).
Given the elaborate hearing that the matter received, Scott most cer-
tainly indicates that the Ninth Circuit will hereafter apply Leary, at
least insofar as it deals with the section 176a presumption, even to
cases in which the judgment of conviction became final prior to Leary.
Scott was submitted to the jury on alternative theories-presump-
tive knowledge and proven knowledge. As one of the theories had
been determined to be constitutionally invalid, the conviction had to be
reversed4" unless it could be shown on the basis of overwhelming
evidence of actual knowledge produced at trial that the instruction on
presumptive knowledge was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.4 '
The court then reviewed the evidence as to Scott's actual knowledge
of the imported nature of the marihuana and found it "not overwhelm-
ing."-42
There was a lengthy and well-reasoned dissent by Judge Trask, 3
with whom four others concurred. He too reviewed in great detail the
history of the Supreme Court's application of the retroactivity guide-
lines and concluded that "justifiable prior reliance on the presumption
by law enforcement officials and the potential massive burden placed
on the administration of justice outweigh considerations arguing for full
or partial retroactivity. '44  Judge Trask, however, did not express
his views as to the purpose of the Leary ruling. In this respect he failed
to adhere to the prior pronouncements of the Supreme Court.
Retroactivity-The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation
The majority in Scott seems to have followed quite consistently
what has come to be the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Supreme
Court's retroactivity criteria.45  This circuit has adhered almost ver-
this line should a final judgment be collaterally attacked, the fact that this statement is
dictum is perhaps one reason why the United States has chosen not to appeal.
40. "It has long been settled that when a case is submitted to the jury on alterna-
tive theories the unconstitutionality of any of the theories requires that the conviction
be set aside. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)." Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1969).
41. 425 F.2d at 59, citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
42. 425 F.2d at 60. The court felt that the testimony of agent Gordon, denied
by Scott, was not sufficient to convict the defendant.
43. Id. at 62. Judge Kilkenny would have affirmed Scott's conviction because
Scott had failed to except to the instruction at trial. Id. at 61 (dissenting in part).
44. Id. at 70. Judge Trask believed that the retroactive reach of Leary should
extend only to cases in which the trial commenced after the date of the decision.
Id. at 62.
45. "Retroactivity, indeed, has been denied in two classes of cases only. First,
there are the cases where the clear purpose of the new rule is to deter conduct extrinsic
to the trial itself and unlikely substantially to affect the reliability of the determination
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batim to the guidelines in Stovall and Desist in deciding at what stage
of the judicial process a new criminal ruling should apply. For exam-
ple, if the purpose of the new rule "is to deter misconduct of police of-
ficers in conducting a search, the new exclusionary rule will not be given
retrospective effect because that purpose is not advanced by penaliz-
ing conduct that has already occurred." 46  Accordingly, when the
Ninth Circuit was recently called upon to determine the degree of re-
troactivity to be accorded Chimel v. California,4 7 the court stopped
far short of full retroactivity. In Williams v. United States,4" Judge
Hufstedler emphasized that the purpose of the ruling in Chimel-
which held that the search of the house in which the defendant is ar-
rested is not within the constitutional perimeter of a search incident to
an arrest-was entirely procedural: to deter illegal police conduct.
Because full retroactivity would not further such a purpose, the court
held Chimel would apply only to cases in which the unlawful search
occurred after the date of the Supreme Court decision.
On the other hand, where the purpose of the new rule is to insure
the accuracy of the determination of guilt or to "correct an abuse that
endangers 'the vary integrity of the fact-finding process,' then decisions
announcing the new rules have been held fully retroactive."49  In
accordance with this principle, the Ninth Circuit has held that the Su-
preme Court's new rule in Haynes v. United States 0 would be fully
retroactive. Under Haynes, a plea of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is a complete defense to a prosecution for possession of firearms
not declared pursuant to a Federal registration statute. In Meadows
v. United States,51 a case in which the defendant's conviction had be-
come final a full 2 years before the date of Haynes, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea
of guilty to the identical charge found in Haynes. Judge Wright
ruled that even though defendant Meadows had not asserted his self-
incrimination privilege at the time of his plea, the defect in the judg-
of guilt. Such cases have principally involved the exclusion of evidence obtained by
illegal searches and seizures. [Citations omitted.]
Second, there are the cases where the purpose of the new rule is ambiguous, but
where the retroactive application would mean substantial disappointment of the rightful
reliance on the old rule by law enforcement authorities, and place great burdens on
courts called upon to reopen cases long since closed." Meadows v. United States, 420
F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1969).
46. Williams v. United States, 418 F.2d 159, 162 (9th Cir. 1969).
47. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
48. 418 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1969).
49. Meadows v. United States, 420 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1969).
50. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
51. 420 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1969).
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ment of conviction went "to the very center of the legal justification for
the punishment imposed." 52
As evidenced by Williams and Meadows, among others, the Ninth
Circuit has taken great pains to determine the purpose of the new con-
situtional ruling and to accord or to deny full retroactivity on that basis
alone. Such is the rule of Desist5 -other factors should be taken into
consideration only when the purpose is not clearly evident.
The Ninth Circuit seems in accord with the other circuits (as far
as they have gone) with respect to interpretation of the Leary deci-
sion. 4 Every circuit that has dealt with a direct appeal of a section
176a case, no matter when the judgment of conviction was rendered,
has held Leary applicable and has reversed the conviction-unless, of
course, the presumption instruction was determined to be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. But no circuit, including the Ninth, has
as yet dealt with such a conviction that had already become final be-
fore the date of Leary. Hence, the exact degree of retroactivity to be
accorded Leary remains very much in doubt. 5
The Ad Hoe Approach in the Supreme Court
Should the line of reasoning in Judge Trask's dissent be picked up
in another circuit or indeed should the Government decide to contest
the application of the Scott dictum to a case that had already become
final, what is the forecast concerning the Supreme Court's ultimate
disposition of the retroactive reach of Leary?5" If in the past the
Court had been as willing as the Ninth Circuit has been to adhere
to its own retroactivity guidelines, the answer would be much more
certain. But, unfortunately, even a cursory examination of the results
that the Court has reached in applying Linkletter, Stovall and Desist
52. id. at 799.
53. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
54. See note 15 supra.
55. The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Scardino, 414 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1969)
has held that "the principles announced in the Leary case are to be given prospective
application." Although this case dealt with the section of Leary that was over-
turned by the Supreme Court (see note 6 supra), and the language of the entire opin-
ion is somewhat loose, this may indicate that the Fifth Circuit will find itself in dis-
agreement with the Ninth as far as the section 176a decision is concerned.
56. As mentioned above, the circuits have yet to deal directly with a section 176a
conviction that has become final. Until they do, the Supreme Court is unlikely to
take up the matter of Leary's retroactivity. The Court apparently approves the ap-
pellate courts' actions so far as they have gone, for recently it denied certiorari to
several post-Leary appeals of section 176a convictions in which the unconstitutional pre-
sumption instruction was held to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Petley v.
United States, 427 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3147 (U.S. Oct.
13, 1970); United States v. Mahoney, 427 F.2d 658 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
United States v. Garcia, 39 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1970).
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to its major constitutional nlings discloses what is essentially an ad hoe
approach to the problem.17
Since Linkletter, the Court has ruled upon the retroactivity of over
a dozen of its major criminal procedure decisions. In all but five, full
retroactivity was denied. These five dealt with the problems of the
use at trial of preliminary hearing testimony in lieu of an absent wit-
ness,58 counsel at a preliminary hearing,59 counsel at a probation-
ary hearing, 0 admission of one defendant's confession against his co-
defendant61 and exclusion of jurors conscientiously opposed to capital
punishment. 2 Certainly, as must be found according to Linkletter,
in each of these cases the purpose of the rule held fully retroactive was
to safeguard the very integrity of the guilt-adjudicating process.
However, in attempting to reconcile the rationale of these decisions
with that of other cases denying full retroactivity to similar important
constitutional rulings the Court's lack of consistency becomes apparent.
It is difficult to understand why the purposes of a decision recognizing
a defendant's right to trial by jury in a serious contempt case,63 pro-
scribing prosecutorial comment on a defendant's refusal to testiff 4 or
recognizing the right to counsel at a police line-up65 is not clearly to
insure "the fairness of the trial-the very integrity of the fact-finding
process." 66  Yet the Supreme Court has declined to give full retro-
active effect to decisions establishing these rules.
57. As Tudge Trask pointed out in his dissent in Scott: 'It is probably impossible
to completely rationalize the decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject of retro-
activity. A close reading of those decisions reveals an essentially ad hoc consideration
of each newly articulated constitutional right." United States v. Scott, 425 F.2d 55, 68
(9th Cir. 1970).
58. Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969), giving full retroactivity to
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
59. Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968), giving full retroactivity to
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
60. McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968) (per curiam), giving full retroactiv-
ity to Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
61. Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), giving full retroactivity to Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
62. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (habeas corpus proceeding).
63. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), allowing retroactivity only to cases
in which trials had begun after the date of decision in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194
(1968).
64. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), limiting the rule of
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), only to cases on direct review on the date
of Griffin.
65. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967), which limited the effects of
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967), to any pre-trial confrontation conducted after the decision date. See note
25 supra.
66. Linldetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
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Certainly, when dealing with major constitutional interpretations
that have invalidated criminal procedures operative for decades, the
burden on criminal law enforcement would be substantial when any of
these rulings would be held fully retroactive. 7  The Supreme Court
declared as much in Desist when it held that such criteria are second-
ary in importance to the determination of purpose. Consequently, the
purpose criterion should be the deciding factor between those rulings
granted and those rulings denied full retroactivity. But an attempt to
find a clear, consistent and convincing application of this factor fails.
For example, the purpose of a decision forbidding the exclusion of
jurors conscientiously opposed to capital punishment"8 appears to
be indistinguishable from that of a decision recognizing a defendant's
right to trial by jury in a serious contempt case.69 One is led to the
conclusion that despite its pronounced guidelines, the Supreme Court's
approach to retroactivity remains uneven. It is perhaps Mr. Justice
Harlan who has been most vocal on this point. Speaking of the Court's
implementation of long overdue reforms in this field he has said:
This in my opinion can only be done by turning our backs on the
ad hoc approach that has so far characterized our decisions in
the retroactivity field and proceeding to administer the doctrine
on principle. 70
The common denominator that guides the Court in these cases, which
has eluded some, seems quite clear to others. Mr. Justice Black has
said:
It would be hard to find a more apt summary of this Court's hold-
ings in the "retroactivity" cases than the statement that they "ex-
al[t] the value of finality in criminal judgments at the expense
of the interest of each prisoner in the vindication of his constitu-
tional rights."'71
67. "It has not been the usual thing to cut down trial protections guaranteed
by the Constitution on the basis that some guilty persons might escape. There is
probably no one of the rights in the Bill of Rights that does not make it more difficult
to convict defendants. But all of them are based on the premise, I suppose, that the
Bill of Rights' safeguards should be faithfully enforced by the courts without regard to a
particular judge's judgment as to whether more people could be convincted by a re-
fusal of courts to enforce the safeguards." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 650
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
68. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
69. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968). Sometimes the Court com-
pounds the incongruities when it finds what seems to be a purpose directly and sub-
stantially affecting the guilt adjudicating process. For instance in this case the Court
said: "One ground for the Bloom result was the belief that contempt trials, which often
occur before the very judge who was the object of the allegedly contemptuous be-
havior, would be more fairly tried if a jury determined guilt. Unlike the judge, the
jurymen will not have witnessed or suffered the alleged contempt, nor suggested prose-
cution for it." Id. at 634.
70. Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 224 (1969) (Harlan, I., dissenting).
71. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 240 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
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Whether or not the Court has unduly exalted the value of finality
in its determination of retroactivity as Mr. Justice Black contends, one
thing that can be said with assurance is that there is no guarantee of the
certainty with which the lower courts can work in applying the Supreme
Court's own guidelines to its criminal rights pronouncements.
The Future of Leary
In light of this uncertainty, can an intelligent forecast be made
about the future of Leary? The answer must be yes. It would seem
that the Court will have little choice but to hold fully retroactive that
portion of the Leary decision which invalidated the section 176a know-
ledge presumption.
Although Scott will not be the case in which the Supreme Court
resolves the issue of Leary's retroactivity, it seems likely that the
Court's approach to the issue will be similar to that of Judge Hufsted-
ler in Scott.72
Assuming the Supreme Court adheres to its own guidelines in Sto-
vail and Desist and looks first to the purpose underlying the new rule,
it is difficult to see how it could arrive at any conclusion other than that
the purpose of Leary was to correct a serious flaw in the fact-finding
process:
The premise of Leary is that the presumption is, in part, factually
unsupportable. It follows that of those convicted of violating sec-
tion 176a by use of the presumption, many are innocent of that
crime.73
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court lapses into its unfortunate
tendency to approach each retroactivity question on an ad hoe basis,
the recent history of the Leary decision at the appellate level seems to
indicate that even if the number of appeals and collateral attacks is
great, the burden on the judicial system would be slight and would not,
as is usual, stand in the way of its being held fully retroactive. As in-
dicated by Petley"4 and Plascencia-Plascencia 5 in the Ninth Circuit,
a review of the trial record in cases where evidentiary presumptions are
involved"6 will rather quickly reveal whether the prosecution had pro-
duced sufficient evidence on which to base a determination that the
defendant actually knew the imported nature of the marihuana, i.e.,
whether the section 176a presumption instruction was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt. If evidence of actual knowledge was pro-
72. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
73. United States v. Scott, 425 F.2d 55, 59 (9th Cir. 1970).
74. Petley v. United States, 427 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1970).
75. Plascencia-Plascencia v. United States, 423 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1970).
76. See note 11 supra.
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duced, the appeal is swiftly ended. But where such evidence is lack-
ing, even though the lack is due to the prosecution's reliance on the
wording of section 176a, then the conviction cannot be allowed to
stand. Even assuming that a substantial percentage of convictions have
been based solely on the section 176a presumption, and consequently
could not be affirmed on the harmless error theory,77 the burden
on court calendars resulting from full retroactive application of Leafy
seems outweighed by the necessity of vindicating the constitutional
rights of defendants convicted on insufficient evidence.
Taking positive steps to unclog our crowded courts and to
expedite the trial and appellate processes seems much more desirable
than violating the time-honored presumption that a man is presumed
innocent until convicted of the crime of which he is accused. Justice
Douglas puts it very well:
It still remains a mystery how some convicted people are given
new trials for unconstitutional convictions and others are kept in
jail without any hope of relief though their complaints are equally
meritorious. 78
Stephen A. McFeely*
77. In his dissent in Scott, Judge Trask, through the use of the Annual Report
of the Director of the Administrative Office for 1969, attempted to determine the im-
pact of giving Leary full retroactivity. United States v. Scott, 425 F.2d 55, 69 (9th
Cir. 1970).
78. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 255-56 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissent-
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